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All we hear is radio gaga, radio googoo, radio blahblah 
Radio, what’s new? Radio, someone still loves you 
– Queen, “Radio Gaga” 
 
In the history of the still-fledgling media form of online radio, the year 2002 will 
come to be seen as a time of drawn-out legal and legislative battles over sound 
recording royalties which seemed to spell the end for U.S. Webcasters at a number of 
points during the conflict. Protagonists in this trench warfare were a loose and 
increasingly fragmented coalition of online radio operators from the very small to the 
very large, and including Net-only Webcasters as well as the rebroadcasters of 
terrestrial stations, and on the other side the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) and its SoundExchange royalty collection agency as the 
representatives of performance copyright holders (yet following a wider agenda which 
remains the subject of intense guesswork). Also appearing in a story which at times 
began to resemble an episode of The West Wing were a motley crew including the 
Librarian of Congress, an ugly CARP, and – in an unlikely role as saviour of the 
industry – veteran Republican Senator Jesse Helms. 
The battlelines for this fight had been drawn long before, however. When the grandly 
named Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) became law in the U.S. in late 
October 1998, it introduced, inter alia, a requirement for royalties to be paid by online 
stations. Rates for such fees were to be determined according to a ‘willing 
buyer/willing seller’ model: “in establishing rates and terms for transmissions by 
eligible nonsubscription services and new subscription services, the copyright 
arbitration royalty panel shall establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the 
rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller” (DMCA, 1998, p. 37) – in other words, they were expected 
to reflect what were standard fees in the digital media market. The DMCA itself did 
not set such rates, however, but left this task to an independent Copyright Arbitration 
Royalty Panel (CARP), made up of members temporarily appointed by the U.S. 
Copyright Office. Once set, royalties dating back to the date of passage of the DMCA 
were then to be paid retroactively by Webcasters. While agreements with ASCAP and 
other relevant bodies over performing rights (royalties due to the authors of 
copyrighted material) were reached soon – and resulted in an average rate of around 
3% of a Webcaster’s annual revenue required to be paid (ASCAP, 2001) –, no 
decision had yet been made about royalties for sound recordings (due to the actual 
performers of a specific piece) as late as 2001, raising fears of a significant backlog of 
accumulated fees for at least three years suddenly burdening an industry which had 
yet to prove its profitability. Some Webcasters even preemptively began pulling the 
plug on their channels: in April 2001, for example, the ClearChannel network of on- 
and offline stations shut down its 150 Webcasters (Borland, 2001). 
 
A Brief Overview of the 2002 Skirmishes 
 
The Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) on Webcasting held its 
deliberations on a royalty fee structure during the second half of 2001. Central to its 
decision-making were the contrasting models proposed in submissions from interested 
parties:  
 
• the RIAA demanded a payment of around 0.4¢ for each song and listener – in 
other words, a Webcaster playing ten songs per hour, with an average 100 
listeners at any one time, would have to pay 10 × 100 × 0.4¢ = $4 per hour. 
For a Webcaster like Spinner.com with its then around 150 channels of 
continuous content, therefore, yearly fees would come to a cool $5.25 million 
(plus retroactive payments back to 1998, of course). The RIAA based this 
suggestion on a variety of deals it had already struck with operators like 
Yahoo!, thereby suggesting that such rates were indeed based on real-life 
‘willing buyer/willing seller’ examples. 
• the Digital Music Association (DiMA), on behalf of Webcasters, suggested 
0.14¢ for each song per hour (leaving out the number of listeners altogether), 
giving the much smaller rate of 10 × 0.14¢ = 1.4¢ per hour for a Webcaster 
playing ten songs in the hour, or yearly fees of around $18,000 for the likes of 
Spinner.com. (The DiMA had originally considered suggesting a percentage-
of-revenue solution similar to the royalty agreement with the performing rights 
bodies, but apparently felt it needed to match the per-song approach espoused 
by the RIAA. This would prove a costly error of judgment.) (DiMA, 2001) 
 
It is also worth noting that the parties involved in the CARP process were by no 
means representative of all Webcasters, due in part to the set-up of CARPs in general: 
participants in CARPs commit to paying an unspecified share of the costs of the 
process (which are themselves unknown until the CARP process is concluded, of 
course), making participation unaffordable for anyone but well-financed organisations 
and thus shutting out a large portion of the still-emerging Webcasting market. 
Especially as regards digital media copyright issues, therefore (where smaller startups 
are predominant), this form of essentially outsourcing U.S. Copyright Office 
deliberations to independent panels may be seriously flawed. 
In February 2002, then, the first major bombshells hit the Webcast scene. On 7 
February, with the CARP decision still pending, the U.S. Copyright Office largely 
followed the RIAA’s recommendations for how the broadcasting of copyrighted 
material had to be reported to the RIAA’s SoundExchange agency. It not only 
required Webcasters to submit a total of 18 items of data for each song played, but 
also asked for the keeping of an ‘ephemeral phonorecord log’ (tracking ephemeral 
copies such as MP3 files made to facilitate the Webcast itself but not used for other 
purposes), as well as for seven further data points about a station’s listeners: 
 
(i) The name of the Service or entity; 
(ii) The channel or program, using an identifier corresponding to that in the 
Intended Playlist; 
(iii) The date and time that the user logged in (local time at user's location); 
(iv) The date and time that the user logged out (local time at the user's 
location); 
(v) The time zone of the place at which the user received transmissions (as an 
offset from Greenwich Mean Time); 
(vi) The unique user identifier assigned to a particular user or session; and 
(vii) The country in which the user received transmissions. 
(Copyright Office, 2002a) 
 
If – in addition to questions over the legality of such extensive user tracking – this had 
already raised operators’ worries about their ability to meet new regulations, worse 
was to come less than a fortnight later, when the Webcasting CARP handed down its 
recommendations (to be acted on by the Librarian of Congress on behalf of the U.S. 
Copyright Office). Here, too, the decision was much closer to the RIAA’s 
recommendations than to the Webcasters’ suggestions, especially as the CARP chose 
to endorse a per-song/per-listener model rather than the alternative per-hour or per-
revenue solutions (CARP, 2002). While noting that “because many webcasters are 
currently generating very little revenue, use of a percentage-of-revenue royalty … 
could result in a situation in which copyright owners are forced to allow extensive use 
of their property with little or no compensation”, and that “this potentiality was 
something Congress specifically cautioned against in enacting DMCA” (CARP, 2002, 
p. 37), this ignores another stated aim of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: to 
promote the use of digital media and grow that market. As Rep. Klug stated in the 
final House debate before the passage of the DMCA, for example, through the Act 
Congress aimed to protect copyright “in a thoughtful, balanced manner that promotes 
product development and information usage, indeed the very ‘progress of Science and 
the useful arts’ set forth in the Constitution” (Congressional Record, 1998, H10621). 
The CARP recommendations, being still prohibitively high for many Webcasters, 
failed to stay true to such aims, then, by setting rates of: 
 
• 0.07¢ per song and per listener for commercial Webcasters rebroadcasting 
content from terrestrial stations, 
• 0.14¢ per song/listener for Net-only commercial Webcasts, 
• a further 9% of these royalties for ephemeral recordings; 
 
• 0.02¢ per song/listener for a tightly defined category of non-commercial 
Webcasters rebroadcasting terrestrial content, 
• 0.05¢ per song/listener for Net-only non-commercial Webcasters with up to 
two side channels (plus 0.14¢ for any other side channels). 
 
Once again, thus, ten songs per hour streamed to an average of 100 listeners would 
cost a Net-only Webcaster $1.4 per hour, or upwards of $12,000 per year and per 
channel if they operated continuously every day – with fees retroactively payable 
from late 1998 (Spinner.com with its 150 would still owe over $1.8 million per year 
under these assumptions). Most hobbyist operators, it should be noted, would not fall 
under the non-commercial category here, which addresses a narrow form of public 
broadcasting only. 
Almost immediately after the release of these recommendations, the battle began in 
earnest. On 5 March 2002, the Webcasters launched SaveInternetRadio.org, in a late 
attempt to coordinate their lobbying efforts – while the Librarian of Congress was 
legally bound to ignore any public representations in his ongoing consideration of the 
CARP report, moves were soon underway to appeal for help to the Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property at the House of Representatives, the 
immediately responsible body in the federal U.S. legislature (see e.g. RAIN, 2002). 
The Webcasters’ efforts were hampered by their failure to present a completely united 
front, however: while a majority of their numbers participated in lobbying initiatives, 
those stations which mainly constituted the online wings of established terrestrial 
broadcasters pursued a different course through their peak body, the National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB). Given that AM and FM radio stations were 
exempt from sound recording royalties altogether (with their broadcasting of music 
considered as beneficial promotion for copyright holders), they argued that they 
should not need to pay for Webcasting music if they did not have to pay for 
broadcasting the same content offline (see e.g. NAB, 2002). By contrast, many of the 
smaller operators who could scarcely hope to scrape together the cash to pay backlog 
royalties, let alone future fees, simply began to wind up their operations in this 
apparently hopeless situation. 
By contrast, the RIAA was unhappy, too, and demanded even higher royalty rates, 
reiterating its 0.4¢ per song and listener target and introducing new demands of higher 
royalties for longer songs (an additional 20% for each minute after the first five) and a 
minimum licence fee of $5000 (Maloney, 2002a). In response to serious concerns 
over the legality of snooping out user unformation, it did drop its demands for a 
listener log as part of the reporting process, however. 
If the DMCA had indeed aimed to promote the growth of digital media, the CARP 
recommendations clearly began to have a contrary effect. Increasingly, however, it 
also became obvious that the root of the problem in good part lay with the DMCA 
itself, which set out the CARP process and required the ‘willing buyer/willing seller’ 
model. The CARP’s own recommendations contain a record of its deliberations on 
what existing ‘willing buyer/willing seller’ agreements it could base its decision on, 
and indicate that a 1999 deal between the RIAA and Yahoo!’s Broadcast.com service 
served as its main model; in fact, they state that “the Yahoo!-RIAA negotiation was 
the only one to reflect a truly arms-length bargaining process on a level playing field 
between two major players of comparable skill, size, and economic power” (CARP, 
2002, p. 61), and that “the elements of this agreement, its economic significance, and 
the matching strengths of the parties who negotiated it, all support its use as the most 
reliable benchmark for what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to in the 
marketplace” (CARP, 2002, p. 70). Not only does this not take into account the very 
significantly changed marketplace of 2002 (after the dotcom crash, and amidst the 
post-9/11 advertising slump and general recession) in comparison to the dotcom 
euphoria of the late 1990s – adding insult to injury, statements by Broadcast.com 
founder Mark Cuban later also revealed that the deal had indeed been drawn up by the 
two parties with the specific aim to stifle competition: 
 
When I was still there (the final deal was signed after I left Yahoo!), I hated 
the price points and explained why they were too high. HOWEVER, … I, as 
Broadcast.com, didn't want percent-of-revenue pricing.  
Why? Because it meant every "Tom, Dick, and Harry" webcaster could come 
in and undercut our pricing because we had revenue and they didn't. … 
The Yahoo! deal I worked on, if it resembles the deal the CARP ruling was 
built on, was designed so that there would be less competition, and so that 
small webcasters who needed to live off of a "percentage-of-revenue" to 
survive, couldn't. 
(qtd. in Maloney & Hanson, 2002) 
 
Buyer and seller, in other words, were only too willing to come to an agreement on 
royalty rates – but the deal struck here most likely does not represent the best rates to 
be negotiated in a free market, but rather is the result of collusion to close the market 
to the entry of new players. 
Finally, some press coverage also began to emerge, and by the end of April around 20 
members of the House of Representatives had agreed that the CARP proposal in its 
present form was contrary to the intent of the DMCA and standing Congress policy 
(Maloney, 2002b). On the wave of such recognition, Webcasters staged a ‘Day of 
Silence’ on 1 May 2002, which saw some stations shut off their streams altogether for 
the day, others interrupting their programme with support messages or periods of dead 
air, and some syndicating a 12-hour talk show about the issue produced at the one-
man Webcaster WOLF FM. The event itself sparked further significant press 
coverage. 
Congress was slowly beginning to recognise this problem. On 10 May, the Copyright 
Office held a roundtable on the recordkeeping requirements; on 15 May, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee convened a hearing on Net royalty rates. Both seemed clearly 
timed to affect the impending decision on how to proceed from the CARP 
recommendations, due from Librarian of Congress James H. Billington by 21 May – 
and indeed, Billington rejected the CARP recommendations, in turn sparking a review 
of the CARP model by the House of Representatives which later produced a highly 
critical report (see Subcommittee, 2002). Though under siege and dwindling in 
numbers (to a point where industry newsletter RAIN had begun to keep a list of 
stations gone offline in response to the likely fee structures), the Webcasters, it 
appeared, had finally won a battle – but not yet the war. 
Having rejected the original CARP recommendations (without further explanation), 
and after further representations from the parties involved in the CARP process, 
Billington now designed his own fee structure – and the Webcasters’ joy at having 
apparently ‘defeated’ the RIAA proved to be short-lived, since his rates did not 
constitute a marked improvement over the original recommendations, and continued 
to use the RIAA/Yahoo! deal as a benchmark (the Cuban story had not yet broken): 
Billington suggested 
 
• abandoning the distinction between Net-only and offline rebroadcasters, and 
applying the 0.07¢ per song/listener rate to both for the commercial, and 
• 0.02¢ per song/listener for the narrow non-commercial category (plus 0.07¢ 
for each further channel after the first two), as well as 
• lowering the ephemeral recordings surcharge from 9% to 8.8%. 
(Copyright Office, 2002b) 
 
At ten songs per hour streamed to an average of 100 listeners, a continuously 
streaming Net-only Webcaster would therefore pay 70¢ per hour, or more than $6,000 
per year and channel. (Spinner.com with its 150 would still owe over $900,000 per 
year). While effectively halving fees for many Webcasters, this was still seen as 
prohibitively high for many of them. It did further the already obvious fragmentation 
of the Webcasters’ cause: some of the larger operators now felt that rates were in a 
range they could live with, while the smaller stations continued to oppose it 
vehemently – and the NAB still maintained its fundamental opposition to paying 
royalties for their rebroadcasts at all. On the other hand, for very different reasons the 
RIAA also voiced its strong criticism of the lowered rates. 
With a newly formed Voice of Webcasters organisation now representing some 30 
smaller stations, both sides’ lobbying efforts in Washington began once again. Time 
was now running out: the Librarian’s ruling would take effect on 1 September, with 
the first royalty payments due on 20 October. In spite of the lead-up to the November 
mid-term elections and the overwhelming focus on the ‘war on terror’ and the likely 
war against Iraq, a group of three Representatives introduced an “Internet Radio 
Fairness Act” on 26 July (Inslee, 2002), designed specifically to support the smaller 
operators by exempting businesses under $6 million in revenue, and changing from 
the CARP ‘willing buyer/willing seller’ model back to ‘traditional standards’ for fees. 
This bill, in turn, was dropped in favour of a bill known as HR.5469, and sponsored 
by House of Representatives member James Sensenbrenner on 27 September 
(Sensenbrenner, 2002). 
Titled “Relief for Small-Business Webcasters Act”, this new bill simply aimed to 
suspend the Librarian’s decision for six months, effectively buying some time for the 
parties involved to devise a more equitable royalty fee structure. Essentially, 
therefore, Sensenbrenner’s bill was a none-too-subtle hint to the warring groups to 
stop fighting and start talking, and it had almost immediate effect, with RIAA and 
Webcaster representatives meeting in the Congressman’s office to draw up a new fee 
structure (neither hobbyists nor rebroadcasters of terrestrial content were party to 
these negotiations, however). 
Especially against the backdrop of the preceding months of conflict, the result of these 
negotiations was phenomenal both with a view to the fact that a compromise was 
reached within little more than a week, and considering that the new fee structure 
emerging from the talks constituted a move away from the per-song/listener model to 
a percentage-of-revenue approach. Passed by the House of Representatives as a 
revised version of HR.5469 now titled “Small Webcaster Amendments Act”, it 
proposed that: 
 
• small Webcasters under $1 million in revenue would pay 8% of revenue or 5% 
of expenses (whichever was higher), or a minimum of $2000 per year, with 
future rates rising to 10-12%, while 
• very small Webcasters could elect to pay the CARP-recommended fees which 
may be cheaper in some cases 
(“Small Webcaster Amendments Act”, 2002) 
 
The bill, still to be ratified by the Senate, did not address non-commercial stations, 
rebroadcasters, or larger Webcaster organisations, however, which would still be 
bound by the Librarian’s ruling – which could be seen as a significant flaw, as many 
of the ‘smaller’ Webcasters, such as the many college and university Web-radio 
stations would be regarded as part of their larger parent organisations here. 
Time was now almost up, with the first royalties under any fee structure due by 20 
October 2002. Once again Webcasters’ hopes for a reasonable settlement were 
disappointed, however, when a last-minute intervention by Senator Jesse Helms put a 
hold on the passage of HR.5469 through the Senate on 17 October. While Helms was 
reportedly working with the conflict parties on a better solution than that proposed in 
the present bill, and while the RIAA’s SoundExchange supported this process by 
requesting that eligible small Webcasters pay only a temporary minimum fee of $500 
for now, it still meant that the Librarian’s proposed fees were to come into effect 
within days. 
It would take another three weeks until HR.5469 emerged again, now in its third 
revision and renamed the “Small Webcaster Settlement Act”, sponsored by Helms. 
After the dramatic events of October, the bill, passed by Senate and House on 14 
November and finally signed into law by George W. Bush on 4 December is an 
almost anti-climactic document, as it retreats from the new ground charted in its 
previous version. It contains no definition of what constitutes a ‘small’ Webcaster, 
and includes no predetermined royalty rates (but acknowledges that small Webcasters 
“have expressed their desire for a fee based on a percentage of revenue”, and 
encourages such a fee structure), but throws out the CARP recommendations and the 
Librarian’s fee structure as not suitable for small operators; instead, it required the 
RIAA and small commercial Webcasters to develop their own structures by 15 
December, based on their current negotiations, and gave small non-commercial 
Webcasters time until 30 June 2003 to do the same (“Small Webcaster Settlement 
Act”, 2002). 
Perhaps because of this overwhelming vagueness of terms, this final form of 
HR.5469, now covering small commercial and non-commercial operators only, and 
extending the definition of ‘non-commercial’ further than previously, met with a very 
positive reception from all sides, with those sides also promptly resuming their 
negotiations towards a final deal. The Webcast market was now clearly divided into 
three sectors: ‘small’ Webcasters, to whom this bill applies, larger Webcasters, who 
were covered by the Librarian’s fee structure and appear to be able to live with it, and 
the rebroadcasters of terrestrial radio content, who continue to fight against the 
Librarian’s ruling using the argument that after all they do not have to pay royalties 
for sound recordings used in their terrestrial broadcasts. 
The smaller commercial Webcasters then went on to reach an agreement with the 
RIAA’s SoundExchange agency, developing a “Small Commercial Webcaster 
Licence” which was submitted to the U.S. Copyright Office on 13 December 2002 
(SoundExchange, 2002). It largely follows the terms outlined in the previous version 
of HR.5469, then titled the “Small Webcasters Amendments Act”, and so respects 
Congress’s clear indication that it expected a move to a percentage-of-revenue fee 
structure for small operators. Already in December, the first ‘silenced’ stations began 
to resume their operations as a consequence of this settlement. Similarly, the smaller 
non-commercial Webcasters developed an agreement by 30 June 2003 
(SoundExchange, 2003). This agreement institutes a set of minimum fees of no more 
than $500 per annum for as long as stations do not broadcast for more than 146,000 of 
what the agreement calls ‘aggregate tuning hours’ per month; that is, the sum of the 
listening durations of all listeners to a station – ten listeners listening for one hour 
each, simultaneously or consecutively, would accumulate 10 ath (146,000 ath equate 
to just over 200 listeners tuned in continuously to one channel over 30 days). Where 
that threshold is exceeded, stations can elect to pay either an extra 0.02¢ per song, or 
0.25¢ per aggregate tuning hour. 
 
Now What? 
 
It is tempting to consider these settlements a victory for Webcasters, and indeed their 
persistence against extortionate fee structures must be commended. If the convoluted 
history of this conflict has shown anything, however, it must be that they should not 
feel safe too soon. The present licence structure will continue until the end of 2004, 
and a renewal of the struggle at that point seems not entirely unlikely. 
Clearly, a key factor here is the role played by the ever-belligerent Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), which has established a history of heavy-handed 
negotiating and lobbying tactics in its fight against what it sees as offences by new 
media forms against the recording rights interests it represents. At present, 
Webcasting and filesharing are two of the key battlefields for the RIAA. In spite of 
RIAA Chairwoman Hilary Rosen’s rhetoric of defending the entire music community 
from exploitation by digital media operators, however, the RIAA’s role is today 
viewed with increasing criticism by many commentators as well as by the artists it 
nominally represents. The organisation is seen to represent mainly the interests of the 
oligopoly of major entertainment producers, defending their interests from the 
independent and alternative upstarts which have started to emerge as we move further 
into the information age. 
In the Webcast case, “the smoking gun comes from testimony of an RIAA-backed 
economist who told the government fee panel that a dramatic shakeout in Webcasting 
is ‘inevitable and desirable because it will bring about market consolidation’” (Levy, 
2002, p. 51). This push for market consolidation (the removal of many smaller 
operators in favour of establishing a manageable number of major companies) would 
seem to be in line with what Mark Cuban claims was the main aim behind the 
RIAA/Yahoo! deal – setting a fees precedent which could be used to shut out the 
startups. It is clearly in conflict with the stated aims of the U.S. Congress as it passed 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, however, which hoped to support such 
new industries. 
Eventually, the RIAA might also come into conflict with its own corporate backers. 
What used to be the music majors have now transformed into entertainment-
telecommunication conglomerates, and in defending the property of one arm of these 
companies the RIAA might well stifle the commercial viability of other sectors – with 
filesharing and streaming media as key drivers of broadband uptake, for example, a 
defence of Warner Bros.’ rights as a music publisher may work against the interests of 
AOL as a broadband access provider within the overall TimeWarner-AOL concern 
(not to mention Spinner.com, which has now become Radio@Netscape Plus, and thus 
another TimeWarner-AOL subsidiary). And even music publishers in themselves 
might eventually realise that Webcasters (as well as filesharers) in fact provide a 
useful promotional service for their music (curiously, this view has not translated 
from terrestrial to online radio, as the NAB’s continued court actions show) – and 
contrary to filesharing, the lower quality of Webcasts, and the possibility to protect 
them reasonably well from being saved to disk, actually should make online radio the 
preferred digital music medium for the industry. 
 
In stark contrast to the U.S. Webcast battle, Australian Webcasters and consumers can 
(so far) take heart that the Australian royalty collection bodies have taken a far more 
conciliatory stance towards Webcasters than their American brethren. It is difficult to 
judge whether this is simply due to the relatively underdeveloped Australian 
Webcasting market, and the therefore rather limited importance of Australian 
Webcasting to Australian and international recording industry associations, or 
whether it does in fact reflect a more cooperative attitude as such; at any rate, in the 
light of U.S. developments Australian Webcasters would be well-advised not to 
consider themselves overly safe unless they have come to clear and binding royalty 
arrangements. 
In Australia, the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act of 2001 regulates 
royalty payments for digital media forms; it introduces a ‘right of communication to 
the public’ for which royalties can be claimed (CADA, 2000). For online radio, this 
right is administered by the Australasian Performing Right Association (APRA) on 
behalf of both the Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society (AMCOS) and 
APRA itself. The Webcasting fee structure developed by APRA is relatively 
straightforward: commercial of any size Webcasters pay 5.5% of their revenue, or a 
minimum of $1,100 per quarter year (plus an additional $550 per additional channel) 
– this equates to roughly half of the 10-12% of revenue which small commercial 
Webcasters in the U.S. are required to pay in 2004 under their agreement with 
SoundExchange. Further, APRA also introduces a new category of commercial 
Webcast, ‘active radio’, where listeners have some degree of influence over the 
playlist of broadcasts – here, the rates are 5.83% of revenue or a minimum of $1,375 
per quarter (APRA, 2001). 
Perhaps due to the limited number of Webcasters of any form in Australia, rates for 
non-commercial Webcasters are not specifically stated by APRA; the association 
acknowledges that “the use of music on the Net is still developing and we don’t 
presume to have thought up a licence scheme for every possible permutation”, 
however (APRA, 2001), and offers case-by-case royalty negotiations with prospective 
Webcasters. Anecdotal evidence suggests that APRA is willing to grant experimental 
licences at relatively affordable rates, and the organisation makes clear that its royalty 
structures are still under development along with music uses on the Internet. 
This half-formed state of Australian royalty structures for Webcasting may constitute 
a chance for Webcasters to make their concerns heard before industry or government 
intervention closes off opportunities; it could also be seen as perpetuating a certain 
deal of uncertainty which could become a threat if the RIAA, which has now taken on 
the role of marshalling recording industry bodies around the world to its cause, were 
to lean on its Australian counterparts in order to bring royalty rates here to an 
international (or U.S.) standard. APRA’s so far benevolent stance towards 
Webcasting, which may be born out of a genuine desire to grow rather than stifle the 
Australian market, may stand little chance in the face of such interventions. 
For now, at least, one battle in the Webcast wars is over. Absent a change of heart at 
the RIAA, however, it seems unlikely that it will have been the last one. 
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